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Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to review intuition in the context of organizational change. We 
argue that intuition as a concept requires attention and its formulation is necessary prior to its 
application in organizations. The paper provides a critique of Dual Process Theory and highlights 
shortcomings in organization theorizing of intuition. 
 
 
 
Method: The paper is conceptual and provides in-depth theoretical discussions by drawing from the 
literature on decision and intuition in the context of organizational change. 
 
 
 
Findings and Analysis: In investigating whether Dual Process Theory is sufficiently clear, we found 
ambiguous explanations and arguments. Specifically, the current definition provided by Dane and 
Pratt is not clear in terms of its four sections: (1) The consciousness of non-conscious processing, (2) 
involving holistic associations, (3) that are produced rapidly, which (4) result in affectively charged 
judgments. Finally, we note that the evolutionary perspective is missing and we provide foundational 
concepts for such a perspective, including the discussion of information templates, memes and genes, 
as argued by research, condition intuition. 
 
 
 
Originality and value: The paper finds that an evolutionary perspective develops a picture of intuition 
as an adaptive resource. This evolutionary perspective is currently absent in research and we provide 
foundational concepts for such a perspective. We propose specific arguments to highlight the 
evolutionary perspective. 
 
 
 
Keywords: Dual Process Theory, Intuition, Change, Evolution; Contemporary Organization 
Research; Review. 
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Introduction 
 
 
Humans are often agnostic about the kind of logic found in the annals of Mathematics, Physics and 
Economics. This is particularly the case for practitioners many of whom immersed in the swim of 
organizational dynamics will not use a logical tool to make sense of typical work-day problems. Even 
more impactful decisions like promoting a subordinate to further his or her career for instance, are not 
commonly based on normative theorizing or logic. Much of the time, practitioners and experts 
embroiled in pressured and competitive environments follow their intuitions about situations (Locke, 
2015). Similarly, in their private lives logic has little attraction. Typically, a man will not propose 
marriage to a woman based on the logical fit derived through calculations about offspring 
development and adaptation success. Instead, he would follow his gut feeling. The idea that humans 
live through personal reasoning, often in the form of intuitive feelings, has been around since Barnard 
(1938) and Selznick (1948) argued for the existence of alogical mental states (i.e. states that do not 
wholly reflect normative logic). Recently, in organization research circles renewed interest in the 
phenomena of intuition has emerged. 
 
 
 
 
Focus of Paper 
 
 
There are two broad arguments: first, that intuition is a valuable resource often used by experts 
involved in business negotiations. Second, we must be cautious in praising intuition since it is not 
suitable in all situations. For organization theorists concerned with these arguments, a fundamental 
task involves asking what intuition is (Lieberman, 2000; Evans, 2012; Akinci and Sadler-Smith, 
2012). This forms our focus in the current conceptual paper. In the larger scope of things, the 
challenge for research involves overcoming a research legacy that portrays workers as rational agents 
plagued with intuition and other mental states like emotion. Simultaneously, whether intuition is a 
valuable resource or one that is useful in particular environments, represents a concern secondary to 
the crucial task of determining what intuition is. The current paper addresses this concern by 
 
 
 
i/ critically evaluating the dominant account of intuition offered by Dane and Pratt (2007) and 
ii/ by offering an account of intuition during organizational change based on evolution. 
 
 
The paper is organized as follows: First, the organizational change context is reviewed in terms of its 
importance for studying intuition. Second, definitions of intuition are reviewed and Dane and Pratt 
(2007) dual process theory definition is presented. The components proposed by Dane and Pratt are 
critically discussed and interpreted. The discussion introduces an evolutionary perspective currently 
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absent in organization theorizing of intuition. The perspective suggests ideas in relation to Dual 
process theory. 
 
 
 
 
Why Organizational Change? 
 
 
Human societies remain continuously in flux through the organizing processes of organizations. The 
notion of change is an intrinsic dimension of the organization, which in a sense remains in flux. 
However, use of the term organizational change by scholars specifically refers to intended 
modifications in human and non-human processes of the organization (Ibarra and Pertiglieri, 2010, 
Antonacopoulou and Gabriel, 2001, and Armenakis and Bedeian, 1999). Change management efforts 
are reactions to environmental demands and concerns for operational efficiency. About 70% of 
change projects fail. Successful change depends to a considerable extent on leadership. The Leader 
provides a vision, a direction, and emits security in uncertain conditions of change. He or she provides 
unity and often relies on gut feeling or intuition as a source of important decisions, generated in the 
context of poor rationalizations, high uncertainty and weak communication (Hensman and Sadler- 
Smith, 2011). 
 
Akinci and Sadler-Smith (2012) suggest that organization research should ask what intuition means in 
terms of changes in leader behavior. In this regard, organizational change provides an opportunity (i.e. 
the dynamic environment) to study changes in leader behavior experienced as intuitive moments of 
individual experience in leadership positions. The implementation of organizational change alters 
working conditions and cogently stimulates worker behavior including cognitive as well as behavioral 
reactions. Senior management pressured by the complexity of experience, often withdraws from 
rationalizing behaviors. Instead, overwhelmed, they intuitively grasp a way forward. The point is that 
leader rationality is bounded. It is a limited deciphering framework. In the face of complex and 
dynamically occurring socio-economic change and related sets of humanly incomputable stimuli, 
rational frameworks can fail (see Simon, 1987). When this happens, senior managers in leadership 
positions turn to their gut. 
 
In the 1990’s the CEO of Chrysler Bob Lutz made the intuitive decision to invest in the Dodge Viper. 
At the time, the investment was a radical change in his behavior that made little sense from logical 
perspectives. The vision had come to Bob on a long car drive. He remembers a feeling in his gut 
telling him that it would work. In hindsight the Dodge Viper was a great success (Hayashi, 2001). It 
was ‘gut feel’ rather than mere rationalization that won for Chrysler. When senior managers leading 
organizational change follow their gut, they recognize complementarities in apparently contradictory 
forces of change (Sutherland and Smith, 2013: 220). A business solution that seemingly contradicts 
economic logic hides within it, the complementarities that intuition might draw on. Without this gut 
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feeling the senior manager or leader would myopically circle around the same issues whilst grounded 
and constrained in domain specific knowledge and routines (Salas, Rosen and DiazGranados, 2009: 
10). For example, a finance CEO tends to see the organization in financial terms based on a repertoire 
of experiences. Here, intuition has the power to introduce a fresh perspective that is not crowded out 
by regularity of thought and habit, but by some unique combination of perceptions. To escape from 
regularity Lutz went on a long car drive leaving behind the regulating confines of his workplace. His 
intuition was the breaking and re-integration of conscious patterns of thought. But the converse 
situation also seems to work. During change organisations also hire specialists that bring expert 
domain-specific knowledge to manage aspects of change. Their schemas offer lessons that have been 
learnt through projects with various experiences and environments. Intuitive decisions draw on such 
schemas (Hogarth, 2001; Dane and Pratt, 2007) and play a strategic and project level role during 
organizational change. In other words, intuition during organizational change is the attainment of 
‘other than regular’ thoughts that stand outside rational frameworks of managers. Overall, the 
presence of intuition during organizational change is a distinct opportunity for studying this 
resourceful phenomenon. 
 
 
 
 
What Intuition is and Dane and Pratt’s Definition 
 
 
Over the past eight decades the concept of intuition has attracted attention from management scholars 
in North America and Europe (see review by Akinci and Sadler-Smith, 2012). Etymologically, the 
word intuition comes from the latin word in-tuir. Hodgkinson et al (2008) translate this as the act of 
knowing from within. In other words, intuition is the innate tendency that provides actors with 
knowledge and business solutions. Most studies assert that intuition is different from logical 
reasoning, and at the same time the studies have nothing more to add (Evans, 2010). Historically, the 
term intuition has been associated with mystical revelations popularized in folklore and religious 
stories in cultures around the world. It is a spiritual and transcendental experience of the individual. It 
is a prophetic revelation in primitive belief systems. 
 
Philosophical and scholarly accounts have defined intuition as an immediate apprehension of things 
which involves no explicit rationale or deliberation (Wild, 1938, 226; Rorty, 1967:204; Myers, 2002: 
128; Dane and Pratt, 2007; Akinci and Sadler-Smith, 2012). In other words, a person suddenly 
clenches the answer to a problem, and cannot explain how it came about. For practitioners this 
presents an alternative to rational models (Lieberman, 2000; Akinci and Sadler-Smith, 2012). A top 
executive at Apple, Tim Cook, remarked in his interview that his decision to join the company was a 
gut feeling. His exploration of rational and analytical models had failed him. Similarly, a study 
interviewed officers who rated the credibility of loan applicants. It found that hard data analysis was 
not as valuable as the gut reactions of officers (Lipshitz and Shulimotvitz, 2007). Dane and Pratt 
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(2007) contend that intuition emerged to cope with the trade-off in decision theory whereby decision 
accuracy and decision speed are inversely related. The hope is that intuitive judgments are both 
accurate and timely (Khatri and Ng, 2000). 
 
 
 
 
Related to this, the underlying approach that dominates organization research is the Dual Process 
Theory perspective (DPT) of intuition. The perspective emerged and developed from 1960 onwards, 
and is closely associated with seminal work by Daniel Kahneman. The core underlying assertion is 
the existence of two systems of human reasoning; system 1 and system 2 (Evans, 2012). Over the 
years different studies have offered exclusive features of the two systems, but a growing number of 
studies agree on some shared features (Akinci and Sadler-Smith, 2012). System 1 is older in 
evolutionary terms and it consists of unconscious, rapid, automatic, and high capacity mental 
processes. Such processes are interpreted by Smith and Ward as “cognitive schemas that occur 
without explicit awareness or deliberate intention, which can be described as implicit cognition 
(2012:463). System 2 is relatively recent and consists of conscious, deliberate, and relatively slow 
mental processes. An instance where an actor claims to have had an intuition involves both systems. 
Implicit cognitive processes occur in system 1 and surface as a judgment that seems to be 
automatically integrated within system 2 (Kahneman, 2002). Overall, most of the processing and co- 
ordination of memory structures occur underneath conscious awareness. Akinci and Sadler-Smith 
(2012) highlight that under the DPT perspective an influential definition is offered by Dane and Pratt 
(2007), which has been widely adopted by organization theorists and researchers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Intuition  is  a  (1)  non-conscious  process  (2)  involving 
holistic associations (3) that are produced rapidly, which 
(4) result in affectively charged judgments (2008: 36). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This definition draws on four themes, which are; the non-conscious domain, the related development 
of holistic associations, rapid and automated mental processing, and affective experiences of 
individuals. Critically reviewing these themes in context, the sections below expose considerable 
challenges. The challenges appear through an evolutionary perspective, in particular the usefulness of 
cultural   evolution  is   argued   as   more   suitable   for   organization   theorists,   compared   to   the 
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complimentary process of biological evolution; although both have explanatory power. Organizational 
change studies are used to further contextualize and exemplify points and arguments. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) The Consciousness of Non-Conscious processing 
 
 
This section critically reviews the pitfalls of non-conscious processing and offers a new way of 
thinking about intuition through evolution. Generally, whilst the theme of non-conscious processing 
has been widely adopted by scholars of intuition, there remains philosophical uncertainty on this 
front. How should this type of processing be interpreted if not a set of invisible assumptions? In a 
historical context, the idea of non-conscious processing and structures in relation to intuition can be 
traced to the development of psychological types by Carl Gustav Jung, seminal work by Selznick 
(1948), the notion of Bounded Rationality by Herbert Simon (1987), work on tacit structures by 
Polanyi (1967), through to the Cognitive activation theories that emerged in the late 1970’s and early 
1980’s (Bower, 1981; Salkovskis, 1986; Kahneman, 2002). Specifically, Evans (2003: 458) explains 
that in the DPT context “Dual-process theories of thinking and reasoning quite literally propose the 
presence of two minds in one brain. The stream of consciousness that broadly corresponds to System 
2 thinking is massively supplemented by a whole set of autonomous subsystems in System 1 that post 
only their final products into consciousness and compete directly for control of our inferences, 
decisions and actions.” The passage suggests that whilst a leader consciously experiences the world 
through system 2, the driving schema consist of invisible ghosts of system 1 (i.e. the automated sub- 
systems of intuition). There are two subsystems: heuristics
1 
and constructive structures. Figure 1 
situates these within system 1 and between system 2 (i.e. conscious rationalizations) and biological 
substratum (i.e. Limbic region). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
A heuristic is defined as a rule of thumb. It is a mental program in system 1, which manifests as an automatic 
response that filters through information to deal with environmental cues (Gigerenzer, 2008). Often heuristics 
are sub-optimal responses. That is, they are good enough responses and not the best ones (Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1974). 
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Whilst Dane and Pratt (2007) define non-conscious processing in system 1 by distinguishing it from 
rationalizations of system 2, they also implicitly endorse that both systems are conditioned by neural 
processing; i.e. in reference to basal ganglia activation - Lieberman (2000). Thus, in the above figure 
system 2 works alongside system 1, whilst biological substratum underlines the whole affair. Dane 
and Pratt (2007) take stock of evidence from cognitive and neurological psychology. In these 
disciplines conceptualizations, definitions, and theory is increasingly being based on interactionist 
ontology (Bohl and Van de Boss, 2012). This ontology states that faculties and traits of individuals 
are the result of interactions between forces in biology and society. That is, the change leaders 
intuition is appearing experience that is emergent through the interaction of forces in biology and 
society. However, no philosophical tenet is explicitly stated in Dane and Pratt’s definition. Without a 
philosophical interpretation their cross-disciplinary definition is open to the critical question: are 
systems 1 and 2 substantiations of mind stuff as assumed by Evans (2003), which in turn are reducible 
to physical matter constituting biological substratum conditioned by social experience? If Dane and 
Pratt’s definition implicitly endorses interactionism then the further question arises; is system 1 a 
purely theoretical model that aides the conceptualization of neural and social impact unexplainable by 
system 2 deliberations and conscious inferences? If the answer is yes, then the concept of system 1 
through an interactionism lens represents the theoretical modelling of activity originated in the basal 
ganglia of the limbic region (Lieberman, 2000) continually conditioned by social experiences and 
learning (indicated by arrow in figure 1). Conclusively, it is not a ‘second mind’ as asserted by Evans 
(2003). Consider the example of the electron in physics; this is a point particle with no spatial 
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extension. It is a useful theoretical assumption nonetheless. Similarly, system 1 has no spatial 
extension apart from its neurological substratum. It is useful as a theoretical model. 
 
There has been criticism since the terms system 1 and system 2 were introduced by Stanovich (1999). 
It is argued that “Dual-process theories of reasoning exemplify the backwards development from 
precise theories to surrogates” (Gigerenzer, 2011:739). It is also argued that the two system 
conception lacks conceptual clarity and provides insufficient empirical evidence (Keren and Schul, 
2009: 534). In other words, system 1 is not observable, nor experiential, and thus generalizations that 
adopt the two minds hypothesis rest on theoretical foundations. In the context of such criticism we 
assert that system 1 is a theoretical modelling or set of assertions about what system 2 cannot explain 
but requires for its definition. Simultaneously, system 1 is an accounting for behaviors induced by 
neural activity and shaped by external stimuli. Several questions remain unanswered and reflect 
crucial drawback in conceptualizing intuition, particularly from a cross-disciplinary perspective 
employed by Dane and Pratt (2007). Principled by interactionism intuition research has the 
opportunity to explore new perspectives offered by the powerful idea of evolution. In their extensive 
review of intuition research over the past eight decades Akinci and Sadler-Smith (2012: 117) 
recognize that “Evolutionary perspectives are neglected but potentially fruitful avenue of inquiry for 
intuition research” applicable in organizations. The evolution perspective is an alternative space for 
exploring intuition. A decade earlier in 2006 a special issue in the Journal of Organizational Behavior 
highlighted the explanatory power of evolution. Historically from this perspective topics including 
leadership, teams structure and culture have received limited attention based on work by Jay (1971) 
and Kolodny (1979) and more recently Lawrence and Nohria (2002). 
 
Arguments in such studies emerge from the central idea of biological evolution commonly identified 
with Charles Darwin. Following the publication of the Origin of the species over the following 
century and a half several interpretations of evolution emerged and influenced theory construction in 
biology. This is often denoted as Darwinism. The central idea is modification by descent. This 
involves the forces of natural selection acting to influence the modification of genotype and 
phenotype parts in species populations. These parts pass through generations and enhance the species- 
environment fit (Nicholson and White, 2006: 112). However, the crucial point is that biological 
evolution through modification by descent is a special case of a more general principle known as 
variation-selection-retention. This principle has been applied to natural and man-made environments 
(see Campbell, 1969; and Van den Ven and Poole, 1995 on population changes in social 
organizations). The principle states that in a population over time conditions preserve some recurring 
patterns or information template. In biology this is the gene that constitutes the information needed for 
heredity. There takes place random variation in the template, whereby some traits are selected over 
others because of their adaptation advantage for the template striving to exist in hostile environments. 
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A template may be retained through generations of heredity across the population, depend on its 
adaptation advantages. Underpinning VSR is the interactionism thesis. 
 
The thesis reasonably asserts that trait development is determined through VSR processes acting on 
some information templates, like the human gene, which is conditioned and shaped through 
interactions in society (Mameli, 2007). We propose that the evolution perspective opens space for 
phenomena known as cultural evolution. This offers the meme in Organization research acting 
analogous to the gene in biology. 
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Figure 2 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 illustrates the prospect; interactionism underpins the principle of variation selection retention 
that weaves the evolution of an information template. In the case of biology and psychology most 
studies take the gene to be the information template. In organization theory the current paper argues 
the use of the meme in defining intuition and related condition. This does not exclude the importance 
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of genes, rather it places them as complimentary endowments of the modern worker. A meme is 
defined as a template for cultural transmission of ideas (Dawkins, 1976; Dennet, 1995; Blackmore, 
1999; Distin, 2005). A meme can be an idea, belief, stories, rumors, legends, sciences, or behavior 
pattern of workers. As such it is the information template that spreads from mind to mind of workers 
embroiled amidst change. Just like a gene, a meme is able to replicate and produce copies of itself and 
spread in social organizations. Just as genetic evolution is conceived in terms of gene frequencies in a 
population, memetic evolution can be conceived in terms of meme frequencies spread across the 
organizational landscape (Mameli, 2007:30). The better the fitness of a meme, the stronger are the 
chances that it will occur more frequently (i.e. high meme frequency) and vice versa. Meme fitness 
strength depends on meme features as well as its consequences. From a memetics perspective an 
intuition might be a particular kind of meme (i.e. it is an information template or replicable pattern) of 
thought, which deviates from prevailing patterns found in the rational formalisms of practitioners and 
researchers. Given that memes with strong fitness and thus high frequency tend to be salient ideas, 
intuition in relation to its affectively charged salient content (Sadler-Smith, 2016: 3) qualifies as a 
good instantiation of a meme. We propose that intuition as a pattern of thought consisting of highly 
salient affective content can be categorized as a meme. 
 
 
 
 
Given, the dual process approach by Dane and Pratt (2007) we run into a split. First, broadly 
speaking, the adoption of the meme as the unit of evolution in organizational change is not a divorce 
from consideration of biological influence. The evolutionary mind of the individual is both cultural 
conditioned and possesses genetic tendencies (Tomasello, 1999; Dennett, 2003; Vugt, 2006). We 
adopt the interactionism thesis and propose that intuition can be expressed through evolution by 
drawing on the language of biologists or equally those interested in cultural evolution and memes. 
However, given that genetic variation and influence is much slower then memetic development 
(Atran, 2001: 6), research into organizational change benefits from looking at memes more than from 
direct consideration of genetic development. Whilst a meme is meaningful in its everyday influence 
and meeting of minds, a gene is meaningful over generational timelines as the causal driver of innate 
tendencies. A meme in one sense is epiphenomenal to a gene, whereby the latter is causal (Voland, 
2007). Second, the employment of genes and memes in studying organizations splits up the dual 
process theory further. Figure 3 illustrates system 1 looking to genes for explanatory power, and 
system 2 looking to memes. 
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At an ontological level, Dane and Pratt’s definition is a meme in its own scientific community, but 
this is not a concern in the current paper. In so far as system 1 is a non-conscious system, 
phenomenally it does not engage memes because there is no personal experience. However, if as we 
assert, system 1 is a modelling of neural activation, then the definition sits closer to genetic tendency 
and phenotypic behavior indicated in figure 3. Conversely, system 2 as a conscious system that is 
experienced. It directly engages, constructs and shares memes, and thus sits closer to the memetic 
system of evolution. We propose that this distinction is core for an evolutionary approach. 
 
 
 
 
(2) Involving holistic associations 
 
 
The definition offered by Dane and Pratt (2007) also adopts the idea of holistic associations (see 
Sadler-Smith and Shefy, 2004; Sadler-Smith and Akinci, 2012). Drawing on a host of studies in the 
dual process movement, they argue that intuiting (the unconscious processes of intuitive judgment 
formation) involves two mental operations a/ linking disparate pieces of information together, 
therefore it is associative. And b/ it involves the recognition of patterns, referred to as a holistic grasp 
of experience. In this idea there is an implicit assertion that a and b somehow co-operate. In other 
words, concepts associatively link in the mind and are apprehended by system 2 (consciousness) as 
patterns indicating a holistic phenomenal grasp. Thus, Dane and Pratt (2007) propose the presence of 
holistic associations through intuiting. Their assertion about intuiting involves non-conscious mapping 
of environmental stimuli onto cognitive structures of employees. There are two types of structures 
mentioned earlier. On the one hand, there are mental heuristics.   These are mental shortcuts that 
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enable timely response in demanding environments and have evolutionary origins (Vugt, 2006). In 
evolutionarily older environments this manifests as fight/flight reactions that are visceral and 
relatively less cerebral. On the other hand, there are the more complex data rich structures, which 
involve reflection and deeper inferential thinking by practitioners and experts (i.e. constructive 
processing). The process of intuiting maps the perceptual stimuli onto such structures and somehow 
functions outside the observer’s awareness. Confusingly enough, intuiting implies the lack of any 
logical inference binding a with b (i.e. no meaningful rules for inference are posited, since this is 
purported to be a non-inferential process of recognizing patterns by linking disparate data – not 
inferred causally by some conscious agent). Consequently, there remains poor clarity about how 
holistic associations result from what Dane and Pratt (2007) label intuiting. Van Riel and Horvath 
(2014: 44) ask “what exactly is the matter of holistic associations, and how do they occur? Do these 
holistic associations go beyond linking conceptual entities?” Indeed, clarifying the components that 
constitute intuiting, both in terms of their type (i.e. concepts, images, visceral feelings) is a necessary 
condition for explaining how intuiting unfolds according to some rules. 
 
In so far as holistic associations do not involve logical inference due to lack of an inferring conscious 
agent that can offer deliberations, Van Riel and Horvath (2014) propose the exploration of somatic 
conditions to account for rapid non-cognitive responses involved in intuiting. The causal pathways of 
these somatic reactions are non-conceptual and remain outside deliberations of system 2. Associations 
are conditioned at a somatic level. Such visceral processing seems plausible if system 1 processing is 
acknowledged as a hypothetical model used by researchers to understand for instance, neural 
activations in the limbic region or pre-frontal cortex centers of the human brain underlying employee 
emotion in a change context (Le Doux, 2003). Prospects down this avenue represent a biological 
perspective the contributions of which are not yet clear in organization change theorizing in relation to 
a capacity such as intuition (Van Riel and Horvath, 2014). From the evolutionary perspective, to look 
beyond system 2, and beyond some inferring will, the literature supports and develops distinct ideas 
in the context of holistic associations. Here, we argue that system 1 consists of evolutionarily valuable 
mechanisms for adaptation. The mechanisms process data in parallel and in combination as a product 
of heuristics designed to simplify complex threats in the environment. The first thing to note is that 
system 2 (i.e. consciousness) and its role in causally generating or correlating with intuition heuristics, 
remains a blind-spot on the research agenda (Keren and Schul, 2009: 534; Kruglanski & Gigerenzer, 
2011). This position is exploited by some evolutionary psychologists (Sivertson, 2013) who argue that 
free will of system 2 is an illusion. “Natural selection has no foresight, so it cannot select for buffers 
that protect the development of a trait [such as intuition] against future kinds of perturbations” 
(Mameli, 2007:23). This means that if intuition is a naturally selected behavioral trait, it is not a 
consciously planned human development (Searle, 1995: 13-18). The gene determined trait in question 
favors survival of some generations over others based on its social fitness and mechanical advantage 
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(Cosmides and Tooby, 2000). Intuition is not meaningful in the subjective world of values. It is not a 
choice. In fact, in evolutionary psychology terms, system 2 correlates with system 1, and provides the 
illusion of a will or choice maker to system 2 (Voland, 2007). The process whereby a trait like 
intuition is selected consequently represents a distribution of trait probabilities in a population along 
an evolutionary timescale. Therefore, we might perceive holistic associations as psychological 
capacities on such a timescale, useful for adaptation, and a mechanical phenomenon, experienced by 
system 2, which in retrospect labels it ‘system 1’. That is, system 1 is a working hypothetical model to 
make sense of the impact of mechanical datum, represents an argument adopted, for meaningful 
debates delivered in system 2. 
 
Second, an evolutionary perspective, does not propose two processing systems (systems 1 and 2) 
instead it offers the notion of many psychological mechanisms (Buss, 2005; Van Vugt and Kameda, 
2012). The mechanisms are specifically designed to cope with adaptive tasks and problems. In 
agreement with Dane and Pratt (2007) evolutionary psychology proposes these mechanisms as ‘if- 
then’ rules, namely psychological heuristics. Thus, we find some overlap between Dane and Pratt’s 
definition of intuiting and an evolutionary perspective. Intuiting or the formation of holistic 
association, from the evolutionary perspective, emphasizes a set of heuristics with an adaptive 
function. Third, it seems additionally the case that particular sets of environmental conditions are 
likely to involve intuition based behavior by invoking some useful intuiting set of heuristics. Locke 
(2015) argues that intuitive judgments by leaders can form when individuals encounter unstructured 
problems. Context provides meaning and a range of stimuli (Lasersohn, 2005). An example is a 
human resource judgment about swaying opinion in favor of an initiative. This involves no consistent 
rules, routines and objective criteria. You just go with your gut. In earlier hominids threats were far 
less complex and relatively unstructured. Thus, intuition may well have been present in our ancestors. 
Ronay and Vugt (2014) recognize this evolutionary mismatch between ancestral environments and 
modern society. Evolutionary psychologists studying intuiting may employ computational methods 
for developing interactionist models that represent the interactive generation of intuitive behavior 
(McElreath and Henrich, 2007). For instance, a model can be characterized as follows: Let evolution 
provide a set of heuristics (S) for intuiting. Thus, S maps onto and functions to resolve a set of 
organizational conditions (C) over an event (E), employing relationships (R). Members of S (S
1 
S
2 
S
3
 
…….Sn) over an event E map onto members of C (C1C2 C3……Cn) through relations R that satisfy the 
 
following criteria. First, members of C provide poor information-for-task (C 
min
), which is often the 
case in organizational change that involves intuitive responses by individuals in leadership positions. 
(C 
min
) invokes internal subset of psychological heuristics (S 
max
) evolutionarily designed to cope with 
(C 
min
) conditions. Second, the subset (S 
max
) operates in a nonlinear pattern. Thus, (S 
max
) is a subset 
of S that operates simultaneously through R, and draws on heuristics that are effective in adapting to 
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(C 
min)
. The members of R include sets of R
n 
that are likely or probable to be active over a set E
n 
of E, 
given (C 
min
) and (S 
max
). 
 
The above is an example of the computational approach currently absent from intuition research in 
organization theory. In other disciplines, modelling has been dominant in studies of cognitive 
mechanisms including learning and reasoning and in fields including Evolutionary Game theory 
(Maynard-Smith, 1982) and Evolutionary Computation (De Jong, 2000). In organization change 
theorizing, a computational model would address developmental concerns in relation to the 
distribution of genes or memes, environmental conditions, and dynamics of behavioral relations in 
between, over a given time period. An example is provided by (Henrich and McElreath, 2007) of a 
spiral model of behavior that aims to predict how environments impact a person. Generally, the 
computational approach employs normative theorizing. Models are limited by a finite set of rules, 
states and homogenous data types, which are ideals. The central question is; are computational models 
of intuition sufficient for understanding leader intuition during change? Certainly, in so far as the 
evolutionary computational approach represents a normative science, it appears sufficient in providing 
a range of models designed to gauge how inputs – genetic and memetic – can logically relate with 
behavioral outputs. These are prescriptions in organizational scenarios. In an organizational change 
context, computational models would represent causal mechanisms, just like they do in psychology 
(see Boden, 1988). These mechanisms provide a processual view of the mechanics involved in 
behavior, including subjective utilities, estimates of likelihoods of occurrence, and other cognitive 
tasks underpinned by a multi-program design, often recognized as higher cognition based on human 
biology (O’Reilly, 2006; Sporns, 2014). From an evolutionary perspective, the notion of holistic 
associations represents an adaptive function particularly likely in uncertain scenario of organizational 
change. 
 
This is because evolution has designed adaptive mechanisms to cope with environmental alarms and 
threats (Den Bos and Lind, 2013: 134). Alternative to the computational approach above stands the 
qualitative approach, useful in understanding intuition. This is a concern with a phenomenal “what it 
is like” experience of intuition (Stoljar, 2016). Phenomenally (i.e. in the world of appearances) we 
propose that evolved psychological capacities (i.e. intuition) generate mental models by drawing on a 
spectrum of heuristics. Towards one end of the spectrum are behavioral concerns about visceral 
survival (i.e. safety, shelter, aggression, reproduction), and toward the other end are concerns about 
social survival (socializing, recreational activity, commercial enterprise). 
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Figure 4 
 
 
 
 
 
Heuristics employed in visceral (i.e. bodily) survival were useful in ancestral human environments. 
This includes facial recognition of cues associated with leadership qualities, which provided hominids 
with potential for survival on the grasslands of Africa. In modern society, these older heuristics 
continue to influence the success of leaders in organizations. For instance, during change employees 
attribute trustworthiness to leaders based on facial cues (Penton-Voak et al, 1999; Vugt and Grabo, 
2015) and hence offer support or withdraw. These heuristics are situated near the visceral survival end 
of our spectrum and they are proposed psychological results of biological evolution (Boudry, Vlerick 
and McKay, 2015). On the opposite end of the spectrum sit the social heuristics. These are 
cooperative heuristics. Primarily, they accommodate cultural differences and represent internalized 
social norms in the form of automated behavioral dispositions exhibiting prosocial behavior (Gesiarz 
and Crockett, 2015). Whilst there may be biological hardwiring underlying these, it may be that some 
heuristics are socially learnt by exposure to culture (Petersen, 2012). 
 
We hypothesize that intuiting thus involves a mental model generated by combinations of heuristics 
(C
H
) across the proposed spectrum of possible heuristic combinations (C
u
). Different organizational 
challenges that require specific tasks would influence the combination underlying a mental model that 
emerges into consciousness, like a rising iceberg above the waterline, suddenly whole and complete in 
appearance. The psychological capacity that combines heuristics in the context of the task required 
thus gradually reaches and crosses a threshold of combinations, above which the process of intuiting 
becomes an intuition – a leader’s inspirational vision of how everything fits together. Given (CH) is a 
subset of (C
u
), in a computational model over a given event (E) there might be some combination of 
subsets (C
H
, C
H1
, C
H2
) that accounts for intuition mental models. On this front managerial cognition is 
a fertile area for further research. Given a mental model underpinning an intuitive choice to manage 
people a certain way, research might ask about the nature of categories in mental models and their 
inter-relations through heuristics. 
 
During uncertain times, leaders and followers can find themselves frozen with fear (Moran and 
Brightman, 2000). Their visceral triggers and their underlying neuro-chemistry tells them to ‘fight or 
flee’ the situation, whilst their rational brain centers draw them towards social rules, morals and 
norms of rationalization (Denton and Krebs, 2016). For example, anger and aggression can lead to 
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risk taking choices in uncertain time. Earlier on the evolutionary timeline heuristics involved in such 
behavior directed visceral mobility. Their function was to smoothen out interactions in primitive 
communities. Whilst evolutionarily intuiting seems to involve some visceral heuristics useful for 
survival, on the other hand, heuristics involved in modern social survival seem more complex by 
virtue of the sophisticated tasks and challenges faced by individuals. In the construction of mental 
models, heuristics might conflict, compliment, or cancel out the effects of others heuristics 
(Abatecola, 2014). This suggests that in part, the ratio of the proposed visceral: social survival 
heuristics is moderated by the task at hand. Leaders during organizational change might follow their 
gut because the task at hand is not simple and thus not amenable to rational calculations. Perhaps 
there is insufficient time and insufficient information available. Certainly, options arrived at post- 
rationalization are inferential and thus violate the dual process premise of non-inferential processing. 
In change conditions transformational leaders, alongside inspirational stories and myths about their 
vision for the organization, encourage employees to be altruistic and position self-interest secondary 
to the teams benefit (Marinova, Van Dyne and Moon, 2015). They ask for commitment towards new 
practice and tasks. Crucially, the transformational leader must generate such behavior in his or her 
own public appearances of altruism. The task is complex; altruism in evolutionary terms was a 
visceral type of intuition, it was mobility of the body. In early hominoids it was essential in caring for 
each other. They followed that feeling from the gut. Without cognitively complex capacities, a leader 
felt the return-benefits of intuition in terms of loyalty and deferral to reject the group in favor for self- 
interest (Cosmides and Tooby, 2013; Ostrom, 2014). In modern contexts adopting the task of caring 
and supporting others, the affect heuristic suggests that a leader can intuitively employ emotional 
expressions of camaraderie and other visceral cues; a candid handshake, the silent affirmative nod of 
approval, or the pat on the back. These are system 1 manifestations from sub-programs or heuristics 
working together by selecting-through the complexity of the task (Dane and Pratt, 2007). 
 
As the problem faced becomes more and more uncertain and tasks seem too complex, the leader 
resorts to intuition by loosening analytical reasoning. If a leader advises the practice of altruism, than 
care is needed to intuitively adapt these practices to the change vision. As adaptive behavior (decision 
or commitment to re-act), intuiting by the leader involves letting go and breaking free of cognitive 
routines of thinking, and immersing into the primal and more visceral behaviors suggested along the 
proposed heuristic spectrum. We argue that the as the task becomes more complex and uncertain, the 
leader withdraws from his cognitively loaded straight jacket towards more primitive behaviors. He 
reconstructs from the bottom up, an alternative intuitively informed solution. What aids this process is 
refocused attention away from the organizations ways of doing things and from its bounding 
regularities. Given paralysis by analysis, such behavior represents retrieval to automated heuristics 
that filter data along the propose spectrum (figure 4). As an adaptive tool, intuition involves moving 
from the details of the task towards a more holistic association as proposed by Dane and Pratt (2007). 
17  
Conclusively, the intuiting process underlying leader decision during change conditions represents 
frequencies of genes and memes behaving under task moderation and inversely proportional to the 
level of task complexity. 
 
 
 
 
(3) That are produced rapidly, which (4) result in affectively charged judgments 
 
 
Parts 3 and 4 of Dane and Pratt’s definition mean that decisions based on intuition involve i/ very fast 
processing of data and ii/ emotional content. This aspect of the definition is concerned largely with 
system 1 and the formation and retrieval of emotional content. 
 
 
i/ The processing is so fast, that system 2 is unaware of it. We contend that this argument by Dane and 
Pratt (2007) is epistemologically useful in so far as system 1 rapidity is a hypothesized model or 
explanation needed for system 2 to make sense; however ontologically the rapidity of processes is the 
effect of biological processing (Van Overwalle and Vandekerckhove, 2013), identifiable within 
various organizational situations and scenarios. Dane and Pratt (2007) propose that experts in various 
professions have nonconscious cognitive structures that rapidly link with stimuli directly. This 
involves intuiting which bypasses system 2 (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1986; Klein, 1998, 2003; Prietula & 
Simon, 1989; Simon, 1987, 1992, 1996; Simon & Chase, 1973). Thus, the leader intuitively grasps a 
holistic solution or picture, served by neural activation in circuit with social surroundings and 
conditions. The memory structures that Dane and Pratt (2007) refer to are neurological in nature, not 
hypothetical. This poses a serious limit on how system 1 grounds itself in relevant literature from 
organization research. However, simultaneously, Anderson and Bower (2014:136) have argued that 
biology is too complex. “The level of analysis is just too microscopic to be of any psychological 
utility”. The rapidity of system 1 is necessary theorizing rather than methodological experimentation 
of biology. This suggests that system 1 and memetic evolution may somehow be abstracted and 
linked? We argue that memes evolve and condition rapidity of responses. Given n set of memes in an 
organizational space, the employment of a subset n2 by an observer over a time period of change tx 
signals rapid awareness of a solution by system 2. This process of rapid awareness, where system 2 
suddenly becomes aware does not of necessity imply that system 1 structures were formed over time 
tx. Evolutionarily, system 1 meme-content may have formed over a period greater than tx. Over time 
tx memes may be selected and consumed by observers rapidly (Phuaphanthong and Bui, 2014). 
Memes with low reflective content (i.e. memes with less deliberation involved in system 2) process 
faster compared with other memes that involve reflection. Thus, we propose that organization 
theorizing needs to recognize memes with respect of rapidity and their content. 
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ii/ The last part of Dane and Pratt’s definition proposes that content involved in intuiting and forming 
holistic associations is emotional in nature. This proposition finds support in the work of Kahneman 
and Tversky (1979) and Kahneman (2003) who propose that in memory terms the  availability 
heuristic dictates how a situation is understood. The degree to which memories are available, impacts 
the likelihood of forming certain perceptions of the faced environment. It has been established in 
research that emotional memories (i.e. memories with emotional content) are more readily available 
as fragments of enduring content stored neurology underpinning hypothesized system 1 (LeBar and 
Cabeza, 2006). We support Dane and Pratt’s proposition and additional propose that: given - 
Proposition A – emotional content involved in intuition requires exploration through an evolutionary 
lens. Specifically, emotion in terms of types (basic or complex emotion), need to be recognized in the 
context of evolution and its implications for dual process theory of intuition. It is established that 
emotion is an evolutionarily older response compared to reason. It is also established that emotion is 
categorized as that which is evolutionarily important for physical survival, and more complex 
emotions are required for social survival in information rich environments, which were not 
encountered by early hominids (Massey, 2001). Certainly, it is worth considering that there are 
emotions that are visceral and which had use in early human communities on the plains of Africa 
because they provided sensorimotor responses necessary for vending off predators. Here, researchers  
would look to biological markers and tendencies. In parallel, there are also emotions that are highly 
social in nature. That is, they are learnt within the context of memes battling for survival. 
Interestingly, Heath, Bell and Sternberg (2001) propose that there are memes that are consumed for 
the emotional pleasure involved in the behavior. A leader’s speech that triggers gossip (i.e. meme 
consumption) across the corridors of the organization, by virtue of the emotional pleasure in its 
consumption, might thrive. The shared emotional pleasure across followers may provide the leader 
with stimulus that characterizes the organizational terrain as positive or negative. A happy workforce 
supportive of the leader might subsequently interlock with a biological evolutionary mechanism 
(Massey, 2001) designed to hone on types of organizational terrain. We hypothesize in conjunction 
with our proposition A; that evolutionary explanations of how emotional content through intuiting is 
available, is an example of lucrative research that draws on genetic and memetic evolution. This is 
fertile territory for further research. 
 
 
Additionally, there are two more points of confusion that are present in Dane and Pratt’s exposition 
and arguments. First, in considering parts 3 and 4 of the definition we argue that the phrase 
“nonconscious cognitive structure” (Dane and Pratt, 2007: 44) used to describe system 1 components 
is misleading. Specifically, the term cognitive refers to a process of forming knowledge; there is no 
structure in so far as this implies static structures. Rather, a nonconscious cognitive structure is a 
mental process that involves pattern recognition by ones attentional gaze (Khilstrom, 1990). Related 
to this, Dane and Pratt (2007) propose that various cognitive structures, simple and complex, are 
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schemas, defined by Fiske and Taylor (1991: 98) as “knowledge about a concept or type of stimulus”. 
Applied to schemas in system 1, this definition is poor in so far as it adopts the word “knowledge” 
which implies a knower, or an “I” concept. Conceptual clarity requires that fundamental terms like 
knowledge in discussions of the dual process account of intuition, be sharply defined (see Polayni 
(1967) on tacit knowledge). Knowledge here refers to complex psychological phenomena reducible, 
but not sufficiently explainable, in terms of neural activation in social contexts. 
 
 
Second, Dane and Pratt (2007) directly contradict their system 1 definition as an autonomous model. 
Specifically, the claim that “Individuals who can bring complex, domain-relevant schemas to bear on 
a problem..” implies that “one can bring”; that is, it is not autonomous and involuntary response, but 
rather that it is something under control. This poses a severe limitation on their definition; particularly 
in so far as concepts are poorly demarcated and prone to confusion for further research. 
 
 
 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
 
There are several ideas that provide value in the current paper. First, we propose that Dane and Pratt’s 
(2007) account is insufficiently precise and clear. What is system 1? What is the philosophical basis 
of system 1? If it cannot be consciously experienced in system 2, since intuiting is largely purported 
as outside deliberation, we propose that system 1 is a hypothetical idea that has value because it 
enables recognition of system 2 and biology, as distinct experiential domains. Lack of clarity around 
this has been somewhat addressed by Sadler-Smith (2016) who recognizes that system 1 and 2 are 
metaphors espoused by Evans (2003), however there is far from agreement about this in cognitive 
research. For management research to adopt the dualist account of intuition, clarity is needed that 
system 1 accounts for those effects that are unaccountable by system 2 and causally related to 
observer biology in a social context. It is a hypothetical object. Second, in the dual process approach 
there is no further clarity provided about the nature of processes like intuiting and holistic 
associations. Mental associations are not causal relations between objects, rather, they are loose 
couplings of how we see the world. They are purported as weak explanations of behavior (Kaplan, 
Weaver and French, 1990; Morsella, Riddle and Bargh, 2009). Recalling something to mind may lead 
to certain other images or physical agitations. However, this is again a poor explanation because there 
are no repetitive phenomena. Rather one has a general idea that one observation is associated with 
certain behaviours of intuition. One possibility is to employ probability or Bayesian formalisms 
(Baetu et al, 2011). The purpose is to determine where there is a mental structure or combination 
thereof (i.e. heuristic) that repeats itself and remains recognizable as intuiting or reasoning or emotion 
or some other mental state of the individual? Dane and Pratt (2007) qualitatively hint towards such 
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structures. But as Van Riel and Horvath (2014) note, there is no clarity as to the generation and 
structure of holistic associations. 
 
We propose that an evolutionary interpretation provides value in making sense of intuition within 
organizations. Contemporary organization research poses intuition as a resource for leader and 
managerial decisions. Rather than a dualist conception, evolutionary psychology advocates that 
intuition like other faculties of mind relies on programs that enable adaptation to environments. In a 
change context rife with uncertainty, intuition thus functions as an adaptive resource. We also propose 
that memes are more suitable for study by organization theorists compared with genes. This is 
because genes are subjected to VSR over evolutionary timescales, whereas genes are more rapid 
(Atram, 2001; Cosmides and Tooby, 2013). The operation of VSR on memes is driven by the 
emotional value experienced by the leader or follower in change contexts. 
 
Conclusively, we propose that further research should consider evolutionary perspectives to highlight 
and explore how VSR operates on a variety of information templates such as the gene or the meme. 
Perhaps one can consider the evolution of mental objects (images, concepts, sensory datum forms). 
Additionally, relations between objects may be subject to evolution? This remains immensely fertile 
territory for further organization research. Our view is that only after intuition has been defined, can it 
be contextualised and appraised in terms of its implications for organizations, organizational change, 
and leaders. 
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